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SUMMARY 
Immigrants coming to Canada over the last two decades have been doing 
considerably worse in terms of economic outcomes than in previous decades 
and observers could be missing the real reason why. Until now, we have heard 
suggestions that it has to do with the changing economy, systemic racism or 
barriers to getting foreign work credentials recognized. But one likely possibility 
has not yet been seriously considered: that changes in the early 1990s to the 
way economic immigrants are processed may have resulted in a system that is 
poorer at selecting those immigrants likeliest to succeed in Canada. The good 
news is that this problem is fixable.
There is no question that the decline in wages and labour-force participation 
among immigrants, and their rise in poverty rates, is striking. While, in 1980, 
employed immigrant men earned 85 cents for every dollar earned by employed 
Canadian men, that had fallen by 2005 to 63 cents. For employed immigrant 
women, earnings fell from 85 cents of every dollar earned by Canadian-born 
women in 1980 to 65 cents in 2005. 
While Canadian-born people saw entry-level earnings rise by 20 per cent 
between 1981 and 2007, wages for immigrants classified under the Federal 
Skilled Worker program went the opposite direction, actually falling by more 
than 20 per cent over the same period. In addition, the number of immigrants 
who live below Statistics Canada’s low-income cut off grew by more than a 
third since 1991, even as the number of Canadian-born people below the cut off 
shrank by a third over the same period.
It is hard not to notice that the declines in outcomes began right after changes 
were made to the way these immigrants were evaluated for entry into Canada. 
Most significant was replacing in-person interviews with so-called “perfected 
applications” submitted by mail, and later, online. Under the previous procedure, 
an interview with an immigration officer would often flesh out important 
information concealed by an impersonal application. For example, the policy 
was to interview those applicants who fell just short of qualifying under Canada’s 
1points-based system. This was in case something was discovered during the in-person 
interview that gave the officer reason to add extra points or recommend admission 
anyway. Likewise, those applicants who looked good on paper were sometimes deemed 
by an officer to be less qualified than their application suggested. Today, applicants 
typically hire lawyers or consultants to fill out their application and those professionals 
know how to make an application look good. 
If the government wants to improve outcomes for immigrants, it should run a pilot 
program with two streams of applicants in one or more intake offices: assess half of 
them using the current procedure and the other half using the old interview method, 
then measure their outcomes over the years. 
That should be done alongside other improvements to the immigration system, including: 
lifting the caps on provincial nominees, who have a stronger record of success; providing 
Canadian Experience Class applicants a shorter route to immigration, so they don’t 
abandon their attempts; reintroducing a limited version of the Assisted Relative Class; 
and reducing larger immigration offices in overseas capitals in favour of smaller, more 
regional offices nearer newer immigrant pools. As the government moves to increase 
immigration levels, these changes could make Canada’s already highly successful 
immigration system even more successful.
21. INTRODUCTION
With the federal government’s recent decision to increase immigration levels, there is a need to 
consider how to improve our selection system for economic immigrants.1 Research has pointed 
to the fact that immigrants admitted since the 1990s have been slower to reach average Canadian 
income levels. While the changing Canadian economy, latent racism and barriers to recognizing 
qualifications have been blamed for this decline, the quality of our system of selection of 
economic immigrants has rarely been blamed. However a major change in selection procedure 
was introduced in the early 1990s, concurrent with the start of the decline in settlement outcomes: 
namely, immigration officers stopped interviewing applicants and started to depend on the so-
called “perfected application” submitted, first on paper and more recently, online. 
This paper will examine the major changes in immigrant selection since the adoption of a non-
discriminatory selection system in 1962. It will identify the major advantages and disadvantages of 
changes to the selection system, both in law and in practice, and will make recommendations for 
the improvement in the selection of skilled workers. The Canadian system of immigrant selection 
is widely considered one of the best in the world. Nevertheless, Canada must continue to strive to 
improve the system and this paper is designed to contribute to that process.
2.  OVERVIEW OF THE EVOLUTION OF IMMIGRANT SELECTION FROM 1962  
TO THE PRESENT
The modern era of immigration selection in Canada began in 1962. Prior to 1962, immigrants were 
selected on the basis of a preference system in which immigrants faced varying degrees of difficulty 
in being admitted to Canada. The most favoured were British subjects from the United Kingdom, 
Newfoundland (prior to Confederation in 1949), Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, 
and American citizens, all of whom were eligible to enter Canada provided they could support 
themselves until employment was found. In many cases, travel subsidies were available. 
The second preference applied to citizens of Northern Europe and Scandinavia, who could enter 
freely on the same basis as British and Americans, although there was no travel subsidy available. 
The third preference applied to citizens of Central and Southern European countries, who 
could only enter Canada if they were agricultural workers, domestic servants, or close relatives 
of Canadian residents. Any other workers required a special permit issued by the minister of 
immigration. The fourth preference group comprised the rest of the world and admission was 
limited to those whose potential employer or relative in Canada could obtain a ministerial permit 
(Kelley and Trebilcock 2010, 192). Furthermore, Section 61 (g) of the 1952 Immigration Act 
provided for inadmissibility on the grounds of nationality, citizenship, ethnic origin, peculiar 
customs and unsuitability to Canada’s climate and social conditions, among others (Canada 1952), 
and these were repeated in Section 20(1) of the 1953 Immigration Regulations (Canada 1953). All 
were blatantly discriminatory and officially remained in effect until 1962.
In 1962, then minister of citizenship and immigration Ellen Fairclough succeeded in passing 
regulations that eliminated the preference system and all reference to discrimination against 
particular groups (Canada 1962), intending instead that immigrants would be assessed on the 
basis of their education, training, skills and adaptability. The Globe and Mail greeted the change 
with a banner front-page headline: “Canada Unlocks Its Doors To All Who Possess Skills” 
(Langevin 1962). In 1967, similar criteria (education and training; personal qualities; occupational 
demand; age; pre-arranged employment; knowledge of English and French; and the presence of 
1 This paper does not deal with close family members sponsored by Canadians or permanent residents (“Family Class”) nor 
does it deal with refugees and other humanitarian classes of immigrants.
3a relative in Canada) were incorporated into the world’s first points system to select immigrants 
(Canada 1967). The regulations also provided for Canadian residents to “nominate” their close 
relatives such as brothers, sisters, aunts, uncles, nieces and nephews, who received “bonus points” 
towards acceptance. And, finally, in 1976, a new Immigration Act was passed (Canada 1976) that 
eliminated the odious language of the 1952 act.
The points system continues in effect, but it has evolved over the years. The points system was 
adjusted somewhat in the 1978 Immigration Regulations (Canada 1978, Schedule 1). A major 
change came in 1993 when the Nominated Relative Class (after 1978 known as the Assisted 
Relative Class) was abolished. It was felt that the large point bonus to siblings in particular resulted 
in many immigrants arriving without the skills to succeed in Canada. Yet cancelling the Assisted 
Relative Class resulted in a further concentration of immigration to Montreal, Toronto and 
Vancouver. In 1991, immigration to the three Prairie provinces was 13 per cent of the national total 
(CIC 1999, Table IM8). By 1997, this had declined to 8.5 per cent (CIC 2007, 37). Several provinces 
pressured Citizenship and Immigration Canada (since renamed Immigration, Refugees and 
Citizenship Canada) to allow them to have a say in selection to address their needs that, apparently, 
the federal system of selection was not able to address. The Provincial Nominee Program (PNP) 
was created in 1998 to allow provincial and territorial governments to select a certain number of 
economic immigrants to meet the unique needs of their local labour markets (CIC 2011, 1). 
The PNP has been an enormous success and has been largely responsible for an increasing 
number of immigrants choosing to settle outside of Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver. By 2015, 
immigration to the Prairies had more than tripled since 1997 and represented 27.4 per cent of 
Canadian immigration (Canada 2017). While it is true that the economy of the Prairie provinces 
has been strong over most of this period and has probably served as a “pull factor,” the region’s 
economy had been strong in the past and immigration to the Prairies remained well below what 
it should have been in proportion to the population. The only difference in the last 20 years has 
been the PNP, so credit for this increase must go to the PNP. However, since 2009, Immigration, 
Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) has imposed caps on the program that set the number 
of applicants a province can approve, limiting provinces’ ability to grow their labour markets and 
provincial population (El-Assal 2017, 24-27).
The current legislation, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), was approved by 
Parliament in 2001 (Canada 2001) and came into effect the following year with the introduction of 
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (Canada 2002). The points system included 
in the new legislation focused on skills and was known as the “Human Capital” model (Canada 
2002, sections 78-83). In 2008, a major change occurred with the introduction of the Canadian 
Experience Class (CEC) that allowed individuals already in Canada, who had Canadian work 
experience in higher-skill jobs or who were foreign post-secondary graduates, to apply through 
a simplified assessment that recognized their Canadian experience. This was consistent with the 
government’s priorities to “provide further incentives to retain educated and experienced talent” 
and “to support Canada’s ability to compete internationally for skilled workers, and international 
students” (CIC 2013, 81).
Recently, enormous changes were made to the discretionary power of the minister to allow the  
minister to make major changes to the selection system, changes previously only allowed by  
regulation. In 2008, the omnibus Budget Bill included a provision to issue ministerial instructions  
concerning immigrant selection that previously required amendments to regulations. These  
powers were further expanded in 2012. A subsequent major change in the selection system was 
4the introduction of the Express Entry system, which led, initially, to a move away from the Human 
Capital model of selection. And all of this occurred without public or parliamentary debate 
(Banting, 2015).2 
The Express Entry system involves placing limits on the number of immigrant applications in 
the economic streams and adding a second assessment system in addition to the points system 
defined in the IRPA regulations. Prior to Express Entry, there had been no limit on the number 
of applications and a backlog of hundreds of thousands of application had built up. Express Entry 
has dealt with this problem by creating an “Expression of Interest” stage, at which potential 
immigrants complete an application to apply for immigration to Canada. That “expression of 
interest,” if it meets the minimum entry criteria, is placed in the Express Entry pool and assessed 
according to the “Comprehensive Rating System” (CRS) established by ministerial instruction, 
not by regulation. On a regular basis, the highest-ranking applications are selected and invited to 
make a formal application to immigrate. The numbers of applications invited are based on IRCC’s 
assessment of the number of applications required to meet the annual levels established by the 
minister (IRCC 2018a).
Originally, the CRS was designed to require all but the best candidates to have approved job offers 
and 600 of the 1,200 available points were allocated to having a job. This focus on jobs, rather 
than human capital, resulted in large numbers of people with job offers in mid-range skills being 
accepted, and only about 40 per cent selected on the basis of their human capital. Accordingly, 
in the fall of 2016, the minister changed the CRS by lowering the maximum points allocated for 
a job from 600 to 200 points, and in 2017 further changes provided a small number of points for 
candidates with siblings in Canada (IRCC 2016 and IRCC 2018b). This has resulted in a system 
more focused on human capital (IRCC 2018d, 15), but it also means that now the CRS (IRCC 
2018c) is not that dissimilar to the points system in the regulations (IRCC 2017a) that every 
Federal Skilled Worker applicant must qualify against in addition to the CRS. Table 1 provides a 
comparison of the two rating systems. The table demonstrates that the major difference is that some 
weightings are higher in the CRS, for instance, up to 23 per cent for job offers compared to 10 per 
cent in the regulations. The CRS has additional points for skills transferability, but this is roughly 
comparable to the regulations adaptability assessment. 
2 See Alboim and Cohl (2012) for an overview of changes to the immigration program in the period 2008 to 2012.
5TABLE 1 THE COMPREHENSIVE RANKING SYSTEM AND THE REGULATORY POINTS SYSTEM COMPARED
Comprehensive Ranking System (CRS) Points System (Regs)
Factor
 Points 
Regs
vs. CRS
% Points FactorWith 
Spouse
No 
Spouse %
A. Core/
Human Capital Factors Age 100 110 13% 1% 12% 12 Age
Education 140 150 17% 8% 25% 25 Education
Official Language 
Proficiency 150 160 18% 10% 28% 28 Languages
Canadian Work Experience 70 80 9% 6% 15% 15 Work Experience 
(anywhere)B. Spouse’s Factors Education 10
Official Language 
Proficiency 20
Canadian Work Experience 10
Sub-Total A+B 500
C. Skills Transferablility Post-secondary degree and strong language proficiency 50 6% 6%
Post-secondary degree and 
Canadian Work Experience
50 6% 6%
   
Sub-Total C 100
Sub-Total A+B+C     600          
2% 10% 10 Adaptability
(includes work or
study in Canada
or close relative 
in Canada)
 
 
D. Additional Factors Sibling in Canada 15 2%    
Skill in 2nd Official Language 30 3%    
Post Secondary education 
in Canada 30 3%    
Arranged Employment* 200 23% 13% 10% 10
Provincial Nominee Cert.** 600 50%    
Maximum Allocation Part D   600          
Total with Provincial Nomination   1200          
Total without Provincial Nomination   875   100%   100% 100 Total
Pass Mark Depends on Draw 67 Pass Mark
* Most applicants only receive 50 points. Only Senior Executive positions receive the full 200 points.
** Provincial Nominees are not assessed under the regulatory points system.
The fact that IRCC is using two not very dissimilar selection systems for the same applicants is 
inefficient, as it adds to the assessment workload and it is also less than transparent for something 
as important as how Canada selects its immigrants. Criteria established by regulation require a 
public consultation period before they can be approved by cabinet. The CRS and any changes to it 
require only the direction of the minister.
Another matter of concern is that qualified applicants who are already in Canada, such as temporary 
foreign workers and foreign post-secondary graduates, who we want to stay in Canada and qualify 
for the Canadian Experience Class, now have to go through the Express Entry system. This 
creates an unnecessary element of uncertainty for them in contradiction of the original objectives 
of the CEC to encourage and facilitate such applicants. Many are having trouble getting potential 
employers to commit to them without an assurance that they will become permanent residents. 
This results in excellent candidates for immigration — people who are already here and, through 
schooling or work experience or both, have already largely adapted to Canada — deciding to leave 
6Canada. 
3.  RECONFIGURATION OF THE IMMIGRATION DELIVERY SYSTEM: ‘WE CAN 
SERVE YOU BETTER BY SEEING YOU LESS’3
Changes to how Canada operates its immigration system can involve bureaucratic as well as 
political decisions. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, federal finances were under great pressure 
and the Immigration Department needed to reduce processing costs. It established centralized 
processing centres in Canada to which so-called “perfected applications” would be sent. The 
applicant would never see an immigration officer in most cases. Similarly, the “perfected 
application” was also adopted in Canadian offices overseas and the network of immigration offices 
was radically reduced by closing many of the smaller offices and concentrating work in regional 
processing centres in places such as London, Paris, Damascus (now closed), Buffalo, N.Y. (later 
moved to New York City), Hong Kong and New Delhi. The work was handled by mail and, again, 
most applicants never saw an immigration officer. The associate deputy minister at the time 
summed up the changes, saying “We can serve you better by seeing you less.”
Prior to the service reconfiguration almost all economic immigrants underwent a selection 
interview by an immigration officer trained to determine whether the qualifications and experience 
claimed by the applicant were indeed accurate. The process included inviting for an interview 
those applicants whose points total was just under the pass mark. It was recognized that, at the 
interview, officers might not only determine that an applicant who looked great on paper actually 
did not qualify, but they might also discover that an applicant whose paper application was weak 
was actually fully qualified to emigrate to Canada. This could occur through a reassessment of 
the point total based on information obtained during the interview, in which case the application 
would proceed or be refused on the basis of points. Alternatively, officers could also exercise 
their discretion to substitute their own evaluation, based on their own assessment, regardless of 
the point total (Canada 2002, s. 76(3) and (4)).4 This almost never takes place any more. However, 
due to the requirement to have a perfect application and in the face of complex instructions, more 
and more, applicants have turned for help to lawyers and immigration consultants to complete 
their applications. Lawyers and consultants are paid to ensure that the paper (now electronic) 
applications put the best possible light on the applicant. This does not necessarily mean that the 
applicant is more likely to settle successfully in Canada.
4. SETTLEMENT OUTCOMES
Since the 1990s through to the first part of the current decade, economic outcomes of immigrants 
have consistently declined on the basis of several factors when compared with Canadian-born 
people. Table 2 below shows that wages among immigrants have declined, their labour-force 
participation has declined and the proportion of immigrants with incomes less than the Statistics 
Canada low-income cut off has increased by one-third since 1991, while the number of Canadian-
born people below the cut off has declined by one-third (CIMI 2018).
3 This section is based on the author’s personal experience. To my knowledge, there has been no published research on this issue.
4 
Some might fear that such a determination might be subject to bias on the part of immigration officers. However, an officer’s 
recommendation to approve or reject despite the points score must be reviewed and approved by the officer’s supervisor. In my 
own experience, I recommended the use of “positive” discretion far more often than I recommended “negative” discretion. 
7TABLE 2 ECONOMIC INDICATORS OF IMMIGRANT SETTLEMENT OUTCOMES
Time Period Indicator
Wages Proportion with income belowStatsCan low income cut-off
Labour Force
Participation
Immigrants Canadian-born  Immigrants Canadian-born  Immigrants Canadian-born 
1991-1995 $33,627 $32,607 3.0% 14.8% 19.2% -30.0% 78.2% 80.0% -2.3%
1996-2000 $37,376 $37,431 0.0% 26.5% 18.3% 45.0% 74.0% 78.5% -5.7%
2001-2005 $41,344 $41,863 -1.2% 21.9% 15.0% 46.0% 61.2% 68.1% -10.0%
2006-2010 $46,336 $47,525 -2.5% 22.1% 13.8% 60.0% 77.3% 80.9% -4.4%
2011 - $54,699 $56,369 -3.0% 20.0% 13.2% 51.5% 73.2% 76.8% -4.9%
Note: Statistics Canada uses the term ‘non-immigrant’ rather than ‘Canadian-born’. ‘Canadian-born’ is used here so as 
not to be confused with immigration usage of ‘non-immigrant’ to refer to temporary migrants.
Source: The Canadian Index for Measuring Integration. www.integrationindex.ca
A recent government report showed that while the disparity in labour-force participation of 
immigrants and Canadian-born people is the lowest among OECD countries, the 2006 Census 
showed that earning disparities between recent immigrants and Canadian-born workers continued 
to increase in the first decade of the 2000s. While, in 1980, immigrant men with employment 
income earned 85 cents for every dollar earned by Canadian-born men, this had dropped to 67 
cents in 2000 and to 63 cents in 2005. The earnings ratio of immigrant women to Canadian-born 
women fell even faster, from 85 cents in 1980 to 65 cents in 2005 (Kustec 2012, 16). While the 
Canadian average entry-level employment income (in 2008 dollars) grew from just over $35,000 
in 1981 to about $42,000 in 2007, that of immigrants classified under Federal Skilled Workers fell 
from over $45,000 in 1981 to under $35,000 in 2007 (Kustec 2012, 16,17). 
Picot and Sweetman (2005) argue that recent cohorts of immigrants have been less successful in 
closing the earnings gap between themselves and Canadian-born workers. Picot and colleagues 
in 2007 also provide evidence that recent cohorts of immigrants are more likely to remain in the 
low-income group for longer periods of time (Picot et al. 2007). Picot and Lu followed up with a 
further report in 2017 comparing immigrants and Canadian-born people in chronic low income, 
which is defined as low income lasting for five consecutive years or more. While the proportion 
of immigrants in chronic low income fell from 16.3 per cent in 2004 to 12.3 per cent in 2012, 
the proportion of Canadian-born people fell much more rapidly from 6.1 to 3.7 per cent. In 2000, 
chronic low income was 2.6 times more prevalent among immigrants than Canadian-born people, 
but by 2012 it was 3.3 times higher. As would be expected, the situation was least bad among 
economic immigrants where the chronic-low-income rate in 2012 was 10.2 per cent — lower than 
the overall immigrant average, but still 2.75 times worse than for Canadian-born people (Picot and 
Lu 2017, 12-14).
By contrast, the earnings of those admitted under the Provincial Nominee Program have continuously 
increased since the arrival of the first provincial nominees in 1999. Their entry-level income (in 2008 
dollars) increased from just over $30,000 in 1999 to about $43,000 in 2007, in which year, the PNP 
average entry-level income exceeded that of those admitted as Federal Skilled Workers (Kustec 2012, 
17). One of the reasons for the higher entry-level wages is that many provincial nominees had already 
been working in Canada as temporary foreign workers prior to their PNP application. A recent 
evaluation of the PNP has indicated that, for the most part and in most provinces and territories, it is 
working well and meeting its objectives, which include meeting regional labour-market needs and a 
better nationwide distribution of immigrants (IRCC 2017b, 7, 31).
A more recent report looking at annual income of immigrants relative to the Canadian national 
average for the period 1981 to 2011 shows that entry-level (one year after landing) earnings for 
8Federal Skilled Worker applicants actually exceeded the Canadian average for most of the 1980s, 
but since the 1990s have been consistently below the Canadian average. On a positive note, within 
three years, most Federal Skilled Worker cohorts catch up to the Canadian average (Dempsey 2014, 
2). The same report, however, shows that with the introduction of the Provincial Nominee class in 
1999, principal applicants in this category have had, and continue to have higher than the Canadian 
average income for the year since arrival and afterwards (Dempsey, 2014, 4).
Statistics Canada has reported that data from tax returns in 2016 indicate that the median entry 
wages of immigrant tax filers in 2015 who had became permanent residents a year earlier in 2014 
were $24,000, compared to $36,000 for Canadian-born people. While the gap closes over time for 
most immigrants, some are more successful than others. For example, members of the Canadian 
Experience Class who had already been working in Canada on temporary work permits but became 
permanent residents in 2014, reported a median income of $53,000. By comparison, provincial 
nominees had a median income of $37,000 or slightly above the Canadian-born figure, but Federal 
Skilled Workers had a median income of only $26,000, barely above the median income for all 
immigrants, including Refugees and Family Class members who are not selected for economic 
reasons (Statistics Canada, 2017).
Many studies, including Nadeau (2011), list the usual factors considered in successful economic 
outcomes, such as arranged employment, language proficiency, education, Canadian experience 
and relative youth. However, no reports have suggested that selection following an interview with 
a Canadian immigration officer may be an important factor, despite the fact that interviews were 
stopped at more or less the same time that settlement outcomes for economic immigrants began 
to decline. This, and how Canada configures its selection grid, may possibly point to improved 
settlement outcomes.
5. RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE IMMIGRANT-SELECTION SYSTEM
Canada’s immigrant-selection system is among the best in the world and elements of it have been 
emulated by many countries. That is not to say that we can’t improve it. The foregoing discussion of 
settlement outcomes suggests that we need to do just that. There are a number of ways that this can 
be done in various parts of the selection system. 
Recommendation 1: 
Lift the caps imposed on the number of provincial nominees.
Income data and the federal government’s own evaluation (IRCC 2017b) demonstrate that the 
Provincial Nominee Program is very successful. Given the higher overall immigration levels that 
the federal government has committed to, there is room to increase PNP allocations to provinces 
and territories.
Recommendation 2: 
Eliminate the Comprehensive Ranking System for Express Entry and use  
the existing points system in the regulations.
Now that the points for employment in CRS have been reduced, both the points system in the 
regulations and the CRS are largely comparable. There is no apparent reason for two separate 
assessment systems. If the points system does not reflect every component of the CRS, then 
IRCC should proceed with a regulatory submission to amend the points system, with all the legal 
9transparency involved in that process. Ministerial instructions could still be used to adjust the 
points allocated to individual criteria and to set the number of applications to be processed. IRCC 
could easily use the regulatory points system to populate the Express Entry pool and draw people 
out of the pool in much the same way it has used the CRS. Why add a second points system when 
the regulatory one, properly administered, would work fine?
Recommendation 3:
Exempt qualified Canadian Experience Class applicants from the Express  
Entry system.
IRCC should exempt qualified CEC cases from Express Entry. These persons should not be 
penalized by having to wait in the Express Entry pool. Express Entry works well to control the 
number of applicants from abroad, but it is simply another unneeded barrier for applicants within 
Canada whom we want to encourage to stay in Canada and become permanent residents.
Recommendation 4:
Reintroduce a limited version of the Assisted Relative Class, restricted to  
siblings only. 
The introduction in the Express Entry CRS of points for the presence of a sibling in Canada 
willing to assist is acknowledgement that close relatives do assist in the settlement of immigrants. 
The government should go a step further and reintroduce a limited version of the former Assisted 
Relative Class, but restrict it to adult siblings only, and the bonus points awarded should not exceed 
15 per cent of the total possible. The sibling in Canada should be required to complete a legal 
undertaking of support, as is the case for Family Class sponsorships.
Recommendation 5:
Reconfigure IRCC’s overseas network of offices to have more small offices closer 
to pools of potential immigrants.
IRCC’s network of overseas offices needs to be reconfigured to reflect the realities of the digital 
era. The large processing offices in expensive world capitals should be reduced in size and a larger 
number of smaller offices should be opened closer to pools of potential immigrants. This broader 
network would allow immigration officers both to promote Canada in more areas around the 
world that have been ignored or underserviced over the past two decades and to provide interview 
locations closer to immigrant applicants (see Recommendation 6).5 
Recommendation 6:
Run a pilot project in which immigration officers return to interviewing applicants 
to determine whether most economic immigrants ought to be subject to a 
selection interview.
As noted above, poorer economic immigrant settlement outcomes coincide with move to a 
“perfected application” mail-in (now electronic application) system in the early 1990s. While this 
is circumstantial evidence, the correlation is striking. To determine whether there is a cause and 
5 
It is likely that posting immigration officers from high-cost cities to lower-cost cities might result in operational savings.
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effect, IRCC should run a substantial multi-year pilot project in which immigration officers return 
to interviewing applicants. The current online-only model encourages immigration consultants to 
prepare “made-to-order” applications that cannot be properly assessed without an interview. Also, 
our largest missions are in the most expensive cities in the world (London, Paris and New York, for 
example). Smaller missions without large management overhead and closer to immigrant source 
areas may be more effective and efficient in today’s wired world. Interviews would also allow 
officers to ensure that applicants can speak English or French as claimed. The current language-
testing regime is open to fraud since it is administered by third parties. 
Arguments against returning to interviewing applicants will, no doubt, include the additional cost. 
The pilot project should therefore include provision for cost control. It could be run at two or three 
large immigration offices abroad where volumes would be sufficient to have two teams in place, 
one of which would continue to process cases without interviews and one of which would interview 
applicants.6 Effectiveness of the immigration process, not just cost, ought to be the determining 
factor, but any cost implications need be determined.
Over the length of the pilot project, the settlement outcomes of immigrants who were interviewed 
could be compared with those who were not in order to determine whether there is a significant 
difference in settlement success.
6. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has examined the major changes in immigrant selection since the adoption of a non-
discriminatory selection system in 1962. It has identified the major advantages and disadvantages 
of changes to the selection system both in law and in practice and has made recommendations for 
improvements in the selection of skilled workers. 
The most important recommendation may well be the last recommendation. I believe that 
immigration has to do not just with workers, but with people, all of whom are individual and many 
of whom do not fit exactly into the carefully crafted categories of the immigration legislation. 
There needs to be the opportunity in the selection process to assess the real person, not just the 
version represented in a paper or electronic immigration application. This will result in accepting 
some who are not being accepted now and refusing some who are being accepted now, but overall, 
allowing those best able to settle successfully in Canada to become permanent residents. I strongly 
believe that this assessment can only be done in person, by a skilled immigration officer. 
All six recommendations, if implemented, would improve the selection and processing of immigrants 
to Canada and serve to improve Canada’s excellent selection system for economic immigrants.
6 Certain types of economic immigrants who in the past often had their interviews waived, such as people with previous 
Canadian work experience and senior inter-company transferees, would be excluded from the pilot and would not need to be 
interviewed. 
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